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INSPIRING SECURITY COOPERATION:  




This article regards the European Union’s endeavours at the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) to motivate ASEAN and 
Myanmar to connect with multilateral security cooperation. It discusses two 
assumptions: the EU made efforts to inspire ASEAN to undertake responsibilities; 
and the EU tried to encourage Myanmar to engage in security cooperation. It 
employs an approach underpinned by Checkel’s (1999) social theory, March and 
Olsen’s (1998) logic and observations provided by several interviewees (Southeast 
Asia and Brussels). It relates to the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis that hit Myanmar in 
2008 causing thousands of deaths as the context of this case study. The article 
investigates several questions: has ASEAN responded to the EU’s invitation to take 
courage in shouldering responsibility? Has Myanmar coped with the EU’s call to join 
the multilateral security framework of cooperation? And, lastly, have any lessons 
been derived from Myanmar’s Nargis incident with regard to the European Union’s 
foreign and security policy?  
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This article focuses on the European Union’s endeavours at the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF)1 to 
motivate ASEAN and Myanmar to connect with multilateral security 
cooperation. It is built around two assumptions: first, the EU made efforts to 
inspire ASEAN to undertake responsibility; and this investigation will discuss 
how Checkel’s 2  social mechanisms justify ASEAN’s crisis support for 
Myanmar. Second, the EU attempted to encourage Myanmar to engage in 
                                                        
1
 ARF is formed by the ten ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia) and ASEAN’s 
dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, 
Russia, New Zealand, the United States, Papua New Guinea, Mongolia and North Korea).  
2
 Jeffrey Checkel, Social Construction and Integration, 6(4) JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN 
PUBLIC POLICY, 545–60 (1999).   
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security cooperation; and the article will debate how far March and Olsen3 
explain the logic behind Myanmar’s attempted cooperation. In order to discuss 
these assumptions, a further analytical tool is needed, which is the 
observations made during interviews conducted in Southeast Asia and 
Brussels (2013-2014). Hence, the article’s method of enquiry is formed by the 
joint relationship between Checkel’s social theory, March and Olsen’s logic 
and the interviewees’ explanations. 
The context within which this case study is set is the aftermath of 
Cyclone Nargis that devastated Myanmar in 2008 causing several thousands 
deaths. The article argues that, while the EU sought to convince Myanmar to 
compromise and link to cooperation, the latter, overwhelmed by Nargis, albeit 
indirectly, encouraged the EU Council to insert the responsibility to protect 
(R2P) goal into the 2008 European Foreign and Security Policy. The EU has a 
particular interest in the ASEAN Regional Forum since it is the ‘leading 
platform in Asia for dialogue and cooperation on security’,4 and it co-chairs the 
meetings with ASEAN, the ARF’s founding member (1994). Two years after 
ARF was instituted, Myanmar was accepted into the Forum. The ARF’s co-
chaired summary reports have tended to be employed as the sources for this 
investigation. Summing up, this article investigates several questions: has 
ASEAN responded to the EU’s invitation to take courage in shouldering 
responsibility? Has Myanmar coped with the EU’s call to join the multilateral 
security framework of cooperation? And, lastly, have any lessons been 
derived from Myanmar’s Nargis incident related to the European Union’s 
foreign and security policy? 
 
I. THE EU AT ARF 
 
At the Forum, the EU publicised the multilateral aspects of its policy in 
the field of security on the basis of its experience and aspiration to encourage 
others to follow. At the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence 
Building Measures, which it co-chaired in Potsdam (21-23 February 2005), the 
EU, through its delegates, emphasised what was conceivably the success of 
the multilateral participation in approaching security situations. The EU 
officials explained that governments acting unilaterally were placing 
themselves at a disadvantage, and that multilateral arrangements more easily 
antagonised complex situations.5   
At the other ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence 
Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy co-chaired by the European 
Union in Helsinki (28-30 March 2007), the EU’s multilateral influence featured 
in the explanation (to the ASEAN nations, Myanmar and the other ARF 
partners) of its joint activity with the Organisation of Security and Cooperation 
                                                        
3
 James March and Johan Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 
ARENA WORKING PAPER 98/5 (1998).  
4
 General background on the ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM, European Union External Action, 
Brussels; available at: www.eeas.europa.eu › EUROPA › EEAS › Asean › News  
5
 Co-Chairs' Summary Report of the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional 
Support Group on Confidence Building Measures, Berlin/Potsdam, Germany 21-23 February 
2005. 
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in Europe (OSCE). 6  At the following workshop in Berlin (2008), 
representatives of the EU elucidated the practices associated with an ‘open’ 
dialogue on security. They defended the adoption of a common security 
concept, together with the development of politically binding standards, and 
the gradual institutionalisation of cooperation, all of which they presented as 
processes offering a solid and durable basis for security collaboration.7 These 
discourses promoted at the ARF’s groups and sub-groups, as well as at 
general meetings, aimed at fostering the participants’ multilateral behaviour.    
 
 
II. THE CONTEXT OF THE CASE STUDY 
 
In May 2008, Cyclone Nargis ravaged Myanmar’s Irrawaddy Delta, 
causing widespread destruction and loss of life. Myanmar’s military junta 
refused external help and did little to reduce the difficulties that arose in that 
situation. ARF did not engaged in the action. ASEAN was far more active, 
facilitating the constitution of the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force, led by the 
ASEAN Secretary General and operated through the Tripartite Core Group 
(TCG: the Government of Myanmar, ASEAN and the UN), coordinating the 
relief work and delivering assistance. 8  Two situations derived from this: 
ASEAN provided crisis support for Myanmar; and Myanmar accepted the 
relief operation backed by ASEAN. Might ASEAN have followed the EU’s 
suggestion about assuming responsibility, and might Myanmar have followed 
the EU’s advice to join the multilateral security framework? The following two 
sections will attempt to answer these questions: ‘Lessons learnt from 
ASEAN?’ And ‘Lessons learnt from Myanmar?’ 
 
 
III. LESSONS LEARNT FROM ASEAN? 
 
How ASEAN, in the end, engaged itself in crisis support for Myanmar is 
explained by Checkel’s social theories, which suggest that there are 
processes whereby actors acquire new interests and preferences through 
contact with other contexts, either discursive structures or norms. 9  Three 
points deal with this explanation: group learning, the ability to persuade and 
the crisis and policy failure argument.  
(i) Group learning. The transformative discourses developed at the 
ARF meetings seek to encourage group learning and dispense norms as 
vehicles of new interest.10 The Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence 
                                                        
6
 Co-Chairs' Summary Report of the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional 
Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy, Helsinki, 
Finland, 28-30 March 2007.  
7
 Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the ARF Workshop on Confidence Building Measures and 
Preventive Diplomacy in Asia and Europe, Berlin, 12-14 March 2008. 
8
 Jurgen Haacke and Noel Morada, The ARF and cooperative security: more of the same? In 
Jurgen Haacke and Noel Morada (eds) COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: 
THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (Oxford: Routledge 2010), 219–232, 228. Andrew Selth, 
Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s Fears of Invasion, 30(3) 
CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, 379–402 (2008).     
9




Building Measures, the Peacekeeping groups, and those related to Search, 
Rescue and Disaster Relief, received growing support from the personnel 
from the EU External Service (EEAS) and the Crisis Response and 
Operational Coordination section, 11  as well as from the European 
Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). 12  These personnel, when 
interviewed, confirmed that the frequency of the networking promoted new 
learning, and interactions developed new interests. This result is congruent 
with Checkel’s belief that ‘where a group met repeatedly, and where there 
was a high density of interactions among participants’, new interests are most 
likely to be generated.13  
(ii) The ability to persuade was a further factor contributing to the 
development of new preferences and goals. The interviewed ASEAN leaders 
close to the ARF organisation 14  and Southeast Asian security policy 
analysts 15  acknowledged that those involved in the Forum’s activities (in 
terms of training and assisting with the practical exercises, the EEAS and 
ECHO personnel, and those from OSCE), in most cases, had an enhanced 
persuasive capability, which they accredited to the authority of their position, 
and had the power to influence the actors’ inclinations. This explanation too, 
obtained from the interviews, matches Checkel’s suggestion that, when the 
persuader was an authoritative member of the group to which the persuadee 
belonged/wished to belong, persuasion was most likely to materialise.16  
(iii) Also, the crisis and policy failure dynamics were able to develop 
new commitments and roles. The ASEAN leaders17 suggested that, during the 
crisis of the cyclone, the ASEAN group felt an added responsibility, and the 
role of dealing with the situation emerged as a duty. In addition, the foreign 
policy of Myanmar’s junta to refuse the help of external donors and the lack of 
capability to provide assistance to its own people provided evidence of policy 
failure. 18  The reasons proposed by the above leaders reconnect with 
Checkel’s proposition that the development of new purposes and roles is 
more likely to occur ‘where the group felt itself in a crisis or was faced with 
clear evidence of policy failure’.19  
In the end, it is understandable that new interests, commitments and 
roles easily lead actors to engage in new responsibilities. Hence, Checkel’s 
argument, as substantiated by the interviewees, provided a justification for 
ASEAN embarking on the crisis support action. Yet, concerning this paper’s 
first assumption, has ASEAN responded to the EU’s encouragement at the 
Forum to undertake responsibility? The officers questioned, this time in 
                                                        
11
 Author’s interview with official (B) of the EEAS, of the Crisis Response and Operational 
Coordination, (Brussels, June 2014).  
12
 Author’s interview with official (C) Rapid Response Coordinator, European Commission, 
(Brussels, June 2014).   
13 Checkel, Op. Cit., 549. 
14
 Author’s interview with ASEAN leaders (D) close to the ARF organisation, (Canberra, Sept. 
2013).   
15
 Author’s interviews with Southeast Asian security policy analysts (E), (Singapore, Feb. 
2014). 
16 Checkel, Op. Cit., 550. 
17
 Author’s interviews with ASEAN leaders (F), (Macau, May 2013).   
18
 Selth 2008, Op. Cit. 
19
 Checkel, Op. Cit., 549. 
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Brussels (from the EEAS and ECHO), 20  confirmed that their own activity 
within the ARF groups and sub-groups was intended to transmit new norms, 
that would be assimilated and lead to others’ undertakings. They outlined a 
scenario which agreed with Checkel’s notion that social dynamics created 
‘new drives’ (responsibilities, duties, obligations, tasks), which grew via 
contact with other contexts.21 
 
IV. LESSONS LEARNT FROM MYANMAR? 
 
Myanmar’s acceptance of ASEAN’s (and others’) disaster relief 
assistance indicated a change in the junta’s attitude towards rejecting 
interference in its own affairs, which March and Olsen’s theory seeks to 
explain. These scholars’ ‘logic of expected consequences’ suggests that the 
strategic calculation of the rational bargaining of a government’s protection 
and defence of what it perceives as its national interest confronts, but 
frequently, also, becomes reconciled with the position of other states 
regarding the same policy issue.22 In the post-Nargis situation, the strategic 
calculation of rational bargaining by Myanmar’s junta challenged the position 
of the other actors, specifically ASEAN, and the ASEAN Secretariat, who 
were willing to network with Myanmar’s government. The rational bargaining 
challenge was, firstly, manifested by the junta’s rejection of external help, and 
the defence of what it perceived to be the national interest.  
Only subsequently did a different logic emerge that March and Olsen 
explain as the ‘logic of appropriateness’. 23  To justify this change, the 
interviewees24 suggested several reasons which included the moral aspect of 
safeguarding its citizens, understanding the value of collective regional 
security, strengthening regionalism in Southeast Asia and, not least, 
endorsing cooperation. A strong motive proposed by a Southeast Asian 
security analyst25  was the confidence factor that the ASEAN’s assistance 
mission was to remain under Myanmar’s junta’s own control, which was key to 
its acceptance. This assertion merely recalls the EU’s efforts, at ARF, to 
develop confidence-building dialogues and generate a reliance on security 
and humanitarian operations.  
Yet, concerning this paper’s second assumption, is Myanmar’s 
acceptance of the relief operation (and, so far, their cooperation with the 
group) related in any way to the EU’s indication to join the multilateral security 
framework? The answer lies in the fact that the incentives for Myanmar’s 
change, highlighted by the interviewees, are the proposals that the EU 
discussed at the Forum. Without doubt, the ethical dimension of the 
                                                        
20
 Author’s interviews (B) and (C), Op. Cit.  
21
 Checkel, Op. Cit., 548.  
22
 March and Olsen, Op. Cit., 950. 
23
 Ibid., 951–2.  
24
 Author’s interviews with: Myanmar historian (H) (Yangon, July 2014); Officer (I) of the 
ASEAN Secretariat (Macau, May 2013); security analyst (J) Centre for Non-Traditional 
Security Studies (NTS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang 
Technological University (Singapore, Febr. 2013); Southeast Asian security policy analysts 
(G) (Singapore, Febr. 2014). See: Ludovica Marchi, The EU’s role in developing security 
cooperation with Myanmar at the ASEAN Regional Forum: 2004-2008, 25(2) EUROPEAN 
SECURITY 197–275, (2016), 209–10.   
25
 Author’s interview (G), Op. Cit.   
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responsibility to protect their own people, that the interviewees indicated as a 
duty of ASEAN, with Myanmar there within, is distinct to the EU, as is the 
belief in the value of collective regional security. Likewise, the trust in 
reinforcing regionalism in Southeast Asia is key to both the EU’s idea of 
security and participation in the ARF.26 That Myanmar’s junta should engage 
in reforms, as advanced by the interviewees, has always been demanded by 
the EU, and, also, the principle of continuing cooperation among the regional 
partners is something that the EU predicates at all times. In the end, the 
motivations mentioned by the interviewees appear to be connected with the 
EU’s encouragement of Myanmar to accept multilateral security solutions. 
Yet, Cyclone Nargis, that overwhelmed Myanmar, prompted other reactions 
which closely involved the European Union.   
 
V. LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE EU? 
 
In the aftermath of the cyclone, the EU Council assessed the Union’s 
performance in terms of whether the EU, during the Nargis incident, acted in 
accordance with its identity and norms.27 In 2003, the Council ratified the rule 
concerning the readiness ‘to share in the responsibility for global security’,28 
and later, in 2005, it was at the forefront of the diplomacy that resulted in the 
UN General Assembly’s agreement with the notion of a ‘responsibility […] to 
help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity’. 29  Despite these decisions, the EU remained  
‘normatively un-clear’ on whether it was obliged ‘to assist in circumstances 
like that of Myanmar’s Nargis’.30 In November 2008, the Council discussed 
the state of affairs of its security policy arguing that, after five years of civilian 
missions, a ‘large body of information and experience [was] available which 
needed to be captured in a systematic lessons learned’ exercise.31 A lesson 
has derived from the Myanmar’s Nargis incident to the extent that the Council 
faced a process that March and Olsen describe as being motivated by the 
‘appropriateness logic’. The latter suggests that ‘action involves evoking an 
identity or role[,] and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a 
specific situation’. 32  Cyclone-deprived Myanmar contributed towards 
encouraging the sense of obligation that is embedded in the EU’s identity. It 
moved forward the Council’s new logic, which has been endorsed by law,33 
                                                        
26
 General background on the ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM, Op. Cit.  
27
 ADAPTING THE EU’S APPROACH TO TODAY’S SECURITY CHALLENGES.  
European Union Committee, 21 November, 31st Report of Session 2007-08, (2008), p. 28; 
available at: www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/ ... /190.pdf  
28
 EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY: A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD, 
European Council, (Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003).  
29
 Ludovica Marchi, Fit for what? Towards explaining Battlegroup inaction, 20(2) EUROPEAN 
SECURITY (2011), 155-184, 157.     
30
 ADAPTING THE EU’S APPROACH, Op. Cit., 28.  
31
 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, GENERAL AFFAIRS AND EXTERNAL 
RELATIONS (10 November 2008), Press Release 15394/08(Presse 318), p. 16; available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/104053.pdf 
32
 March and Olsen, Op. Cit., 951.  
33
 REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY – 
PROVIDING SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (Brussels, 11 December 2008), S407/08, 
p. 12; available at: http://www.consilium.  
 7 
and that agreed on a ‘Europe de la securite’ humaine’ as a concept that 
embraced ‘natural disasters’ and ‘multiple sources of insecurity’. 34  This 
concept was acknowledged as appropriate in a response to the Council’s 
question of ‘whether or not the humanitarian assistance to the people affected 




This article has focused on the EU’s attempts, at ARF, to persuade 
ASEAN and Myanmar to connect with security cooperation. Concerning the 
assumption that the EU made efforts to inspire ASEAN to undertake 
responsibility, this investigation has shown that Checkel explains how social 
mechanisms lead to the development of new roles and by adducing the 
Brussels’ interviewees’ explanations that their duty at ARF aimed to 
communicate norms, hopefully guiding others to engage in action, such as the 
relief operation supporting Myanmar – the investigation has shown that 
ASEAN responded to the EU’s proposal at the Forum to assume 
responsibility.  
Concerning the other assumption by the EU which tried to encourage 
Myanmar to engage in security cooperation, the article shed light on March 
and Olsen’s appropriateness logic, which justified the junta’s relaxation of its 
stance and agreement to cooperate. Moreover, by presenting the 
interviewees’ justifications of the Yangon’s changed logic, the investigation 
has demonstrated the link between Myanmar’s new stance and the EU’s 
efforts to convince Yangon to operate within the multilateral security 
framework.  
In the end, by showing that the EU Council is committed both to 
discussing its own civilian missions’ performance and to focusing on a lessons 
learnt effort, this article has argued that, as the EU aimed to persuade 
Myanmar to compromise and join the cooperation, Myanmar, hit by Nargis 
has, implicitly, motivated the Council to include the R2P goal within the 2008 
European Foreign and Security Policy. On the whole, this investigation has 
shown how the combination of Checkel’s social theory, March and Olsen’s 
logic and the interviewees’ justifications, in a joint relationship, contributed 
towards a discussion of this article’s assumptions.  
                                                                                                                                                              
europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf  
34
 ADAPTING THE EU’S APPROACH, Op. Cit., 39.  
35
 Ibid., 28.  
